China's Ministry of State Security (MSS) operates a dedicated institutional priority to help domestic firms evade US chip export controls through procurement, smuggling, and intelligence gathering. In response, the Trump administration is implementing rules requiring licenses for overseas data centers supplying significant computing power to listed countries like China.
China's state security apparatus has spent years helping domestic firms dodge US chip export controls. The New York Times reported Saturday that the Ministry of State Security (MSS) has now made that work an explicit institutional priority, standing up a dedicated chip-acquisition campaign that intelligence officials describe as a blend of procurement, smuggling, and industrial espionage.
The picture that emerges is not of a spy agency stealing secrets in the classic sense. It is of an intelligence service functioning as an accelerant for an entire AI buildout, and of Washington responding with rules aimed at the exact gaps the agency exploited.
What the MSS reportedly built
According to the Times, which cites serving and former security and intelligence officials from the US, Asia and Europe, the MSS has run the campaign for at least two years. Its scope is twofold: helping Chinese companies acquire and smuggle advanced chips into the country, and collecting intelligence on the semiconductor industry and its supply chains.
The organizational detail is what marks this as a state program rather than opportunism:
- A working group led directly by state security minister Chen Yixin, who took over the ministry in late 2022 and has repeatedly framed the fight against Western technology restrictions as a core responsibility. In an April piece in a Communist Party journal, he called for intensifying the struggle against "technological blockades" while advancing AI innovation.
- An internal "Chip Division" and participation in a CCP Central Committee "Artificial Intelligence Task Force," according to summaries of the report by industry trackers.
- Party-level coordination through the Central Science and Technology Commission, created by Xi Jinping in 2023 and chaired by Politburo Standing Committee member Ding Xuexiang.
The Times notes the campaign sits inside Xi's broader push for technological self-reliance. Officials quoted in the report describe adding the overcoming of Western barriers as a stated priority in the agency's updated goals this year.
The Alice Huang thread
The story lands in the middle of the scandal that has consumed Nvidia since October. US officials say the MSS recruited Chinese businesswoman Alice Huang and directed her to gather intelligence on then-CEO Jensen Huang, with the broader aim of pushing Nvidia to make its most advanced chips available in China. Jensen Huang resigned amid the fallout, as previously reported.
Huang's commercial network is documented separately: she ran Megaspeed, the Singapore-based data-center company that purchased billions of dollars of Nvidia chips and leased high-end compute to Chinese customers, and which is under Justice Department investigation over suspected illegal shipments. A November 20 Times investigation, citing a confidential Strider Technologies analysis, traced roughly $3.6 billion in Chinese government funding through companies associated with her family or associates, including data centers that received Nvidia chips. Lettall, which acquired the data-center firm Century Litong, also holds a majority stake in a microwave component maker whose products Lettall has said go into Chinese radar and missile systems.
The Saturday report adds that US officials are examining whether Megaspeed supplied chips to data centers linked to Chinese military research. Importantly, the Times says the available research does not establish that the PLA actually used compute from those data centers. The extent of Huang's role in intelligence operations remains under scrutiny. She has not responded to requests for comment. Beijing has rejected the espionage allegations as "pure fabrication."
Washington's answer targets the loophole
The report also details the policy reaction already underway. The Trump administration announced last week that it will proceed with a rule requiring overseas data centers to obtain a US government license before supplying significant volumes of computing power to companies headquartered in listed countries, including China, Russia and Iran. The restriction takes effect in roughly 90 days.
That rule is aimed precisely at the pattern officials describe: chips bought legally in Singapore or Kuala Lumpur, then the compute, rather than the hardware, flowing to Chinese customers. If compute itself becomes a licensed export, the remote-access workaround that regulators spent 2025 and 2026 chasing narrows considerably.

Why it matters
Two years of quiet escalation in chip enforcement, from entity lists to the Megaspeed indictment cycle, has been treated by the industry as a cat-and-mouse problem between traders and regulators. The Times' reporting recasts it as a state-on-state program with an org chart. For cloud providers and chipmakers, that changes the risk model: counterparty diligence is no longer just about where the boxes land, but about whether the buyer sits inside a task force's remit.
It also raises the stakes for the new licensing regime. Rules that govern overseas data-center compute will be enforced against an adversary whose intelligence ministry has a division-level mandate to defeat them.
Sources:
- The New York Times: China's Spies Set Sights on A.I. Chips Years Before Nvidia Scandal
- Moneycontrol summary of the NYT report
- ET EnterpriseAI summary
- AI Weekly alert on the MSS 'Chip Division'
- Techmeme
Frequently asked questions
How long has China's Ministry of State Security been running its AI chip campaign?
According to reports citing security officials, the MSS has run this dedicated campaign for at least two years.
What is the scope of the MSS's AI chip acquisition efforts?
The campaign's scope involves helping Chinese companies acquire and smuggle advanced chips into the country while collecting intelligence on the semiconductor industry and its supply chains.
How does the US plan to close the loophole used by Chinese firms?
The Trump administration announced a rule requiring overseas data centers to obtain a US government license before supplying significant volumes of computing power to companies in listed countries, including China, Russia, and Iran.
What is the role of Alice Huang in the Nvidia scandal?
US officials state that the MSS recruited Alice Huang to gather intelligence on former Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang to push for more advanced chips available in China.
